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RECENTBOOKSONINTERNATIONALLAW
EDITED BY RICHARD B. BILDER

BOOK REVIEWS

Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule ofLaw
After Military Interventions. By Jane Stromseth,
David Wippman, & Rosa Brooks. New York,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006. Pp. x, 414. Index. $80, £45, cloth;
$29.99, £17.99, paper.
In this incisive and provocatively tided bookCan Might Make Rights?-law professors Jane
Stromseth, David Wippman, and Rosa Brooks
examine the complex task of instituting the rule of
law after military interventions. There are, of
course, many types of military interventions-including, for example, those undertaken unilaterally by one country or multilaterally by the international community, and those motivated by
humanitarian or security concerns. Because globalization tends to blur previously well-demarcated
distinctions, the authors themselves acknowledge
that "there can often be no neat distinction
between 'humanitarian' concerns and 'security'
concerns" (p. 3). Extreme poverty and injustice
may lead to instability, wars, and terrorismwhich, in turn, may further fuel poverty and injustice. As a result, military interventions will likely be
fueled by a mix of actors with a mix of motivations.
These actors and their varied motivations may
have important consequences for conditions faced
by intervenors in the wake of the intervention
itself. As in the case of Iraq, unilateral interventions motivated primarily by a country's own perceived national security interests-especially
when those interests are contested by other
states-will likely be deemed by some other states
as either illegal or illegitimate. To the authors'
credit, however, Can Might Make Rights? provides
an overarching framework in which to examine

the interlocking issues arising out of a rule of law
project following a military intervention, regardless of the initial conditions motivating the intervention. Thus, as the authors note, "however different these various military interventions were on
the front end, post-conflict issues in Afghanistan
and Iraq had a great deal in common with postconflict issues in Kosovo, East Timor, or any of the
other societies subject to international humanitarian interventions before 9111" (p. 6). These postconflict commonalities can, indeed, be found in
societies that would otherwise be radically different. The authors aptly observe that "[a]lthough
Kosovo, East Timor, and Iraq are dramatically different societies, for instance, with divergent histories and cultures, they all had similar needs when
the main phase of the fighting ended" (id.).
The organization of the book reflects the
authors' approach-to provide a comprehensive,
integrated examination of the common issues and
challenges most postconflict societies face. The
book thus is not organized along specific regional
lines, but rather along broader, more thematic
lines that emphasize the necessary building blocks
for rule oflaw efforts-"Blueprints for Post-Conflict Governance," "Security as Sine Qua Non,"
"The Challenge of Justice System Reform,"
"Accountability for Atrocities," "Creating Rule of
Law Cultures," and "Enhancing Rule of Law
Efforts." This approach allows the authors to
highlight not just the historical and theoretical
foundations of a rule oflaw endeavor, but also the
pitfalls and difficulties faced by recent and current
reconstruction efforts. The authors bring out the
nuanced particularities of the situations they
address, but in a way that does not overemphasize
or exaggerate their uniqueness, thereby averting the
hopeless conclusion that no broader lessons can be
drawn from the specific situations discussed.
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Because the authors have managed to cull similarities drawn from so many diverse scenarios and
have also provided the readers with an overarching
set of principles around which to organize rule of
law efforts, they have, in effect, written a curiously
optimistic book, despite what may at first glance
appear to be a generally gloomy assessment
because of the many documented failures in past
rule of law efforts. In addition, conceptual, normative, and theoretical issues characteristic of
broad, abstract approaches to the rule of law are
made concrete by the authors' concerted efforts to
write a book that also benefits the practitioner.
For example, they have drawn on an array of
detailed case studies of armed interventions in
Afghanistan, Bosnia, East Timor, Haiti, Iraq,
Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, and
they have broken down broad themes into eminently digestable parts, including "blueprints"
drawn up to identify what worked and what did
not. This emphasis on the concrete is, indeed,
one of the reasons why the book projects such
an optimistic tone. By focusing on how problems
should be approached, why past efforts had
failed, how to improve the likelihood of success,
and such matters, the book not only aims to be
of help to the practitioner, but suggests, in effect,
that these problems, though entrenched, are not
intractable.
The book's central question, as the authors put
it, is the following: "Concretely, how does one go
about creating the rule oflaw?" (p. 5). The task is
difficult and complex, especially because rule of
law has become "a handy shorthand way to
describe the extremely complex bundle of cultural
commitments and institutional structures that
support peace, human rights, democracy, and
prosperity" (p. 4). But the task is also a necessary
one because, as the authors put it, "military interventions that do not ultimately rebuild the rule of
law in post-conflict societies are doomed to undermine their own goals. This is true whether the
interventions were undertaken initially for humanitarian reasons, securiry reasons, or a complicated mix of the two" (p. 7).
Drawing from their own understanding of the
theoretical underpinnings of the rule of law, as
well as from concrete lessons distilled from specific
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case studies, the authors emphasize one dominant,
recurring theme-as simple and obvious as it is
profound. First and foremost, intervenors need to
realize from the outset that effectively building the
rule of law is immensely complex and beset by
internal contradictions. It thus requires a "holistic
process" (p. 12) that is broadly based and takes
into account, for example, that each sector of
reform is inextricably linked to others. To consider
just one case, if one attempts to build up state institutions, such as the police or the judiciary, without
a concomitant effort to engage in governance
reforms creating a system of checks and balances,
the ultimate result may be to create a lopsided set
of state institutions in which one branch is dominant, willful, or oppressive, or that allows for the
emergence of a political leader with the same characteristics. When the United States launched
Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994,
the United States and the international community separated the much feared military from the
police and implemented police reform designed to
create a professional, well-disciplined force.
Although police reform was initially successful,
the failure to institute comparable reform in other
related sectors, such as the judiciary, ultimately
undermined the positive record of police reform.
Corrupt judges released suspects with political
connections or financial resources, resulting
quickly in the demoralization of the police force.
Consequently, according to the authors, the
process adopted must be "ends-based and strategic, adaptive and dynamic, and systemic" (p. 13).
Political choices must be constantly balanced,
evaluated, and exercised in a holistic way. The
authors call theirs a "synergistic" approach to postintervention rule oflaw. It requires intervenors to
identify fundamental objectives behind a rule of
law project and to adapt existing local resources
and conditions toward these objectives. An adaptive orientation requires intervenors to focus on
the desires and needs of ordinary people and to
engage with grassroots demands. Of course, as I
discuss later and as the authors undoubtedly recognize and warn about throughout their book, this
objective is itself fraught with deeply rooted internal contradictions.
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Nor surprisingly, because of their desire to write
a book that will be helpful to on-the-ground practitioners, the authors opted for a descriptive and
pragmatic definition of the rule of law
in which the state successfully monopolizes
the means of violence, and in which most
people, most of the time, choose to resolve
disputes in a manner consistent with procedurally fair, neutral, and universally applicable rules, and in a manner that respects fundamental human rights norms (such as
prohibitions on racial, ethnic, religious and
gender discrimination, torture, slavery, prolonged arbitrary detentions, and extrajudicial killings). In the context of roday's globally interconnected world, this requires
modern and effective legal institutions and
codes, and it also requires a widely shared cultural and political commitment to the values
underlying these institutions and codes. (P. 78)
This definition can be parsed and analyzed in
many ways. Bur for the purposes of this review,
there are at least two crucial points that are served
by, and embedded in, this definition: first, the rule
of law is inextricable from culture, and second,
security is viral to the rule of law.
I will start with the culture question. Rarely
have rule of law projects taken culture into
account. In fact, most commentators wish to sidestep what is generally deemed a thorny and all-roocontroversial subject. Can Might Make Rights? is
thus one of those rare gems that rake on this delicate subject. Indeed, the authors confront the
issue head-on, declaring that "the rule of law is a
matter of cultural commitments as well as institutions and legal codes" (p. 78). Throughout the
book, culture is granted a prominent stagewhich is not surprising, of course, given the
authors' preference for a synergistic approach.
Such an approach, once recognized as crucial and
adopted as vital, necessitates the view espoused by
the authors that "[w]ithout a widely shared cultural commitment to the idea of the rule of law,
courts are just buildings, judges are just bureaucrats,
and constitutions are just pieces of paper" (p. 76).
Given that the authors have defined the rule of
law to include a relatively thick substantive component-adherence to fundamental human rights
norms-it is obvious that a society's nonadher-
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ence to such fundamental human rights norms on
cultural grounds will present intervenors with a
cultural quandary and more. Intervenors, who are
typically outsiders, will have to confront the difficult choices between promoting international
human rights and respecting local mores and garnering domestic support and legitimacy. This process will, without doubt, require intervenors to
strike a balance that enables them to achieve a set
of locally acceptable arrangements that also meet
international human rights standards.
On the one hand, the authors warn that new
laws, even nominally better ones that satisfy
human rights norms, cannot simply be imposed
from "on high" (p. 195) without creating local
antagonism. Institutions and rules cannot be
imported wholesale but must be constructed on a
preexisting cultural base. On the other hand, the
authors recognize the need, under certain circumstances, to confront the culture issue directly. In
their discussion of Liberia, for example, they note
that reforms cannot take root "without a fundamental transformation of Liberian political institutions and culture" (p. 10 1) and that "domestic
legitimacy is not the only touchstone for law
reform in post-conflict societies" (p. 197). Indeed.
Bur what if the indigenous cultural base is violative of international human rights norms? As the
authors note, in Kosovo the authorities administering Kosovo under UN auspices vacillated
between various options. First, they opted to keep
local law, the law in existence before NATO intervention, as the applicable law. This decision alienated Kosovars, who refused to be ruled by "Serb
law." The authorities resolved the crisis by declaring that the law applicable in Kosovo would be the
law in force before Serbian termination of Kosovo's autonomy-in effect, "Kosovo law," even
though, ironically, it was far less consistent with
international human rights norms than "Serb
law." Recognizing the need to uphold international human rights law, the international authorities also decreed that whatever law was applied
had to be consistent with international human
rights standards.
These conflicting decrees themselves highlight
the clashing imperatives that intervenors face
'when confronted with the question of whether to
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promote self-determination or human rights. One
option is to look for a balance that will not alienate
local actors even as the human rights dimensions
of the rule oflaw are being pursued incrementally.
Another option is to engage outright in a fundamental transforming of local culture, instilling
new values and norms in order to bring local culture into alignment with minimum human rights
standards. The authors state emphatically that
building the rule of law involves "both a practical
project of institution-building and a cultural
project of shaping attitudes and commitments"
(p. 178). At some point, then, intervenors may
have to bite the bullet and confront the dilemma
directly. What should intervenors do when customary practices and the traditional authority figures discriminate against certain vulnerable segments of the population? Of course, the "law"
component of"rule oflaw" must be called upon;
intervenors will draft the necessary laws, construct
the necessary institutions, and provide the requisite institutional tools necessary for broad reform.
Yet history and experience have shown that such
measures are not sufficient. "Changing attitudes
and expectations" is also necessary and "may be the
hardest challenge of all" (p. 246).
New norms would have to be inculcated. If the
effort succeeds, a "tipping point" will be ultimately be reached, and the new norms will "cascade" through a society until they enjoy relatively
broad support. Yet how does one go about doing
this? With much insight and clarity, and in a way
that is both simple and profound, the authors provide examples of how new norms might be
instilled and propagated. Take, for example, their
assessment that two fields of law-"transitional
justice" and "rule oflaw reform," which have been
long segregated and divided into two relatively
separate areas of study-should best be studied in
conjunction with one another. Transitional justice usually focuses on accountability, whereas rule
of law reform, the authors convincingly demonstrate, needs to focus on the inculcation of new
norms. Nevertheless, why not use the criminal trials of perpetrators of atrocities as a vehicle in postconflict societies for instilling in a systematic way
the norms of accountability and transparency?
This suggestion is, of course, itself an example of
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the very "holistic" process that they advocate. As
the authors so aptly put it, the closing of this divide
would mean that "opportunities for valuable synergies between accountability efforts and rule of
law reform programs can be pursued more effectively" (p. 253). The authors then identify three
factors that would maximize the chances that
international accountability proceedings would
have a positive impact on the norm-creating component of rule oflaw: (1) whether key perpetrators
are effectivelydisempowered, (2) whether the proceedings themselves demonstrate a rejection of
past abuses and an embracing of fairness, and (3)
whether the accountability proceedings will contribute to the building of domestic capacity for
instituting the rule of law (for example, through
outreach efforts between the international criminal law sector and its domestic counterpart).
In other words, like so much that is incisive
about the book, the authors have backed up their
normative and theoretical framework with concrete, practical suggestions. If the "rule oflaw is as
much a culture as a set of institutions, as much a
matter of the habits, commitments, and beliefs of
ordinary people as oflegal codes" (p. 310), then
how might it be created? The authors offer some
suggestions. Although lawyers are the ones who
are most likely to be involved in rule of law
projects, they need to think not just about legal
codes and institutions, but also about cultural
transformation, and hence about turning to nonlegal institutions, such as the media, civil society,
and popular culture. The authors urge intervenors
to fund "standard" nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that monitor the justice system and
disseminate information to the public, as well as
less conventional, non-law-oriented NGOs, such
as those that focus on the status of women as
reflected in education and health care.
The authors' focus on women, in particular, is
well placed. Indeed, issues related to women's education and health care have been shown to have a
ripple effect on women's legal rights. As I've discussed elsewhere, 1 the Grameen Bank, which specializes in microcredit, engages in more than just
lending. It has also adopted a social-development
1
Lan Cao, Culture Change, 47 VA.]. INT'L L. 357,
410-11 (2007).
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agenda called the "Sixteen Decisions" as part of its
objective to transform the social consciousness of
its borrowers. At weekly meetings, borrowers thus
agree to advance principles that have health, education, and social components. Some of these
principles address basic sanitation issues, such as
the need to build and use pit latrines. Some address
education by asking borrowers to practice a "deferral of selfish gratification by saving and educating
children." Others deal with social attitudes and
beliefs, such as asking borrowers not to take dowry
at their sons' weddings, not to give dowry at those
of their daughters, and not to practice child marnage.
The effort to eradicate female genital mutilation is another example of moving beyond the law
alone to achieve social change. In particular, countries that have ratified the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women 2 (CEDAW) are obligated by the
terms of the treaty to "to promote equality by
breaking down commonly held stereotypes
impacting culture and tradition.'' 3 Article 5(a), in
particular, requires states parties to "take all appropriate action" necessary "to modify the social and
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women,
with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which
are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereoryped roles
for men and women." To consider one relevant
example, Egypt's effort to eliminate the genital
mutilation of girls had been ineffective by legislation alone. But then, with a view to changing this
cultural practice, one of the nation's largest NGOs
pursued an education campaign aimed at women,
religious leaders, and unmarried men that portrayed the issue as one of family planning and
health care, thus changing the meaning of female
genital mutilation. This Egyptian campaign,
funded by the United States and United Nations,
has achieved a 75 percent eradication rate even in
2

Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 UNTS 13.

3

Cao, supra note 1, at 404; see Abby Morrow Richardson, Women Inheritance Rights in Africa: The Need

s

to Integrate Cultural Understanding and Legal Reform, 11
HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2004, at 19.
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Egypt's more remote villages, and the same experience has been replicated in Senegal. 4
The authors have thus clearly zeroed in on one
of the most glaring gaps in rule of law work. As
they succinctly put it, intervenors need to move
"beyond elites and legal institutions and focus on
the long-term project of building deep cultural
commitments to the rule of law" (p. 346). Their
suggestions run wide and deep-investing in civil
society, legal education, general outreach programs that include women, and so on-much
beyond conventional projects that have focused
primarily on formal institutions and legislation.
As I noted at the beginning of the review,
among the many significant points emphasized by
the authors is that security is, without doubt, the
sine qua non; the authors observe that "extreme
insecurity (insurrection, civil war, frequent terrorist attacks) makes it virtually impossible for societies to sustain the rule oflaw" (p. 78). By the same
token, "[a]bsent basic security, efforts to reform
political institutions, adopt new laws, promote
national reconciliation, and jump-start economic
growth are destined to fail" (p. 134). Yet as the
authors also point out, their case studies show that
military victory is elusive and ambiguous, and
even in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, victory
over Saddam Hussein and the Taliban was simply
a first stage followed by an arduous and complicated second stage of bringing under control the
unending, hit-and-run counterinsurgencies.
That is to say, security may well remain an unresolved issue even as rule of law efforts continue.
Additionally, other, outside states sometimes
intrude into failed states or into those that have not
completed their state-building process. In the
absence of an effective government, such stares are
also susceptible to exploitation by warlords, private militias, bandits, criminals, terrorists, and
other spoilers. Needless to say, building a rule of
law under those conditions is a daunting challenge. The same process that took Europe centuries to complete is collapsed by international actors
into a span of only a few years.
Imagine implementing the disarmament and
demobilization ofbelligerents in an atmosphere of
4

Cao, supra note I, at 405-06.
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chaos and insecurity, and at the same time setting
in motion the conditions necessary to restart the
economy and stabilize the sociopolitical structure
so the former belligerents can be meaningfully
reintegrated. Indeed, not just security-though
security is absolutely vital as a necessary precondition for rule oflaw reforms that follow- but cultural transformation and everything else advocated by a holistic, or synergistic, approach will
require a long-term commitment by intervenors.
Yet this long-term commitment, whether military
or financial, is unfortunately- but predictablyunlikely. Indeed, intervenors' unwillingness to
enter into sustained, costly endeavors is generally
foreseeable. As the authors note, intervenors are
often caught in a catch-22. For example, American
reluctance to use deadly force against looters in the
immediate postintervention period served to fuel
the violence of remnants of the Iraqi army, not to
mention terrorists and other militants. "Spoilers
who conclude that interveners lack the political
will to confront them will invariably take advantage" (p. 158), "especially if the intervenors cannot
be counted on for protection" (p. 147). And Iraqis
who would have otherwise supported coalition
forces in their reconstruction oflraq "had to hedge
their bets for fear that the coalition either could
not protect them or might abandon the whole
reconstruction project" (p. 146). It is not difficult
for the local population to discern that "spoilers
are there for the long haul" (p. 156) or for the belligerents to discern that interveners may be "timid
or incapable of imposing their will" (p. 146).
Yet one needs to ask, what does it mean-in
efforts to achieve the rule of law-to "use coercion" (p. 147) and to impose one' swill? House-tohouse searches? Air strikes? Other draconian measures? The authors rightly observe that the mission
in Afghanistan is endangered "partly because of
the reluctance of the interveners, principally the
United States, to confront the warlords and military commanders who run much of the country"
(p. 160). But what would confrontation email and
require? Throughout the book, the authors urge
intervenors to act decisively. "When spoilers
threaten to derail the peace process through violence, interveners cannot remain neutral. Instead,
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early and vigorous opposition to spoilers may prove
essential to building a lasting peace" (p. 136).
But the requisite military actions by intervenors-which might inevitably result in civilian
injuries and deaths-may well create political
problems and generate new opposition, both
locally and internationally, and even pose potentiallegal problems (are the efforts required to stabilize the country disproportionate?). As a consequence, political realities on the ground and
opposition by domestic constituents in the intervenors' home states may make a holistic approach
to the rule oflaw and postintervemion reconstruction difficult to accomplish. In addition, ifspoilers
are able to flourish and continue their attacks, the
government's ability to maintain order and security will diminish, starting a vicious spiral of deteriorating security and respect for the rule of law.
And unless the situation can be stabilized, the situation can easily, and quickly, come to be seen as
unsalvageable.
As the authors note, troops are often withdrawn
prematurely in "inappropriately early exits" (p.
105), even when, as in Haiti and East Timor, a
continued presence would have been uncontroversial. The reality of these rule of law efforts,
including the maintenance of security, is that
intervenors generally have only a short time frame
in which to complete their missions. The brevity is
not necessarily due to a myopic understanding of
what it takes to draft a constitution and otherwise
move a society more generally toward achieving
the rule of law. It is more likely due to the intervenors' recognition that their own constituents at
home are unlikely to tolerate protracted, expensive, and potentially brutal endeavors in faraway
places. Intervenors are consequently under intense
scrutiny and subject to immense "pressure to end
the fighting ... and to minimize their own postconflict involvement" (p. 89). The authors remark
that "it is often difficult for interveners to muster
the political will to support aggressive measures
against spoilers in the post-conflict intervention
phase. . . . [P]olitical support and associated
resources dwindle accordingly. Tolerance for
casualties similarly declines ... " (p. 156).
As a result, choices are made that are unlikely to
satisfy the holistic, or synergistic, approach that
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the authors favor. For example, the initial mission
in Somalia was to establish a secure environment
for a humanitarian mission-to distribute food to
Somalia's population following the collapse of the
government in the early 1990s. Yet even this limited mission could not be sustained in a situation
that lacked viable institutions and was fraught
with security risks posed by warring clans. Thus,
what started out as a limited humanitarian intervention needed to morph into something more
wide-ranging because the distribution of food
required security-and "sustainable security
requires at least minimally functioning state institutions," which can likely be achieved only" as part
of a larger post-conflict reconstruction and rule of
law project" (p. 140). Additionally, the U.S.-led
Somalia operation was so fearful of "mission
creep" that it resisted expanding its mandate to
include disarming local militias to increase overall
security. The American operation-its scope, mission, and objective-was defined by the insistence
on "an early exit," an insistence that became all the
more vehement when nineteen U.S. soldiers died
in March 1994.
Throughout the book, the authors warn that an
effective rule of law effort requires intervenors
both "to make virtually open-ended commitments of resources and people to post-intervention societies" and to recognize that such an effort
is "likely to be less than popular with domestic
constituencies concerned about how their tax dollars are spent" (p. 4). Nonetheless, the authors
argue in favor of"moral and pragmatic considerations," and caution intervenors against the temptation "to cut and run after the initial military
phase of an intervention ends" (p. 7).
In one succinct phrase, the authors are able to
capture the essence of what has impeded the effective development of postconflict rule oflaw: "Perhaps the most common problem has been haste"
(p. 95). The result: in order to demonstrate quick
improvements to satisfy domestic constituents in
their home countries, intervenors fall for "seemingly attractive short-term options with disastrous
long-term consequences" (p. 132). Even assuming
that intervenors manage to avoid missteps, engage
in the necessary advance planning and coordination, and devote the resources necessary to insti-
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tute the rule of law, the process will inescapably
remain complicated, difficult, and time-consuming, and will be marked by inevitable cycles of
advances and retreats, as well as by "inherent paradoxes and contradictions" (p. 391). In the end,
intervenors' commitment to postintervention reconstruction will depend ultimately on '"whether
assisting the affected country is seen as vital to the
national interests of a major or regional power,'
otherwise 'the resources and commitment necessary for coercive strategies to succeed will not be
forthcoming'" (p. 368, quoting Stephen Stedman).
Whether or not the authors intended it to be so,
many parts of Can Might Make Rights? should be
aimed primarily at rich-country intervenors and
their domestic constituents. That is, one of the
book's few weaknesses is its failure to situate the
time-frame problem identified above in the appropriate context-as inherently interconnected with
domestic politics in intervenors' home countries.
Other parts of the book, such as those that deal
with culture change, are appropriately directed at
those countries in which rule of law efforts are
being undertaken. In any event, the book is a magisterial achievement in both its theoretical and
scholarly sweep, and in the concrete case studies
that will undoubtedly provide invaluable guidance to those doing rule of law work on the
ground.
LANCAO

William & Mary Law School

Fairness in the World Economy: US Perspectives on
International Trade Relations. By Arnerico Beviglia Zampetti. Northampton, MA; Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2006. Pp. ix, 220.
Index. $95, £55.
WTO supporters and antiglobalization activists do not agree on much. However, they emphatically share the assessment that the international
trading system is unfair. Recent years have witnessed an unlikely combination of Nobel laureates, globe-trotting rock stars, and third-world
nongovernmental organizations decry the lack of

